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This study explores the impact of short-term financing on the
operational performance of firms and the relationship of the former
to risk-adjusted profitability. The sample consists of 352 non-
financial firms listed on the KSE (now Pakistan Stock Exchange)
from 2003 to 2014. We use several dynamic panel data estimation
techniques and find that short-term financing is positively but
insignificantly related to firms’ profitability. As far as short-term
financing and risk-adjusted profitability are concerned, the results
confirm the hypothesis that short-term financing has no impact on
risk-adjusted profitability under GMM estimation procedure. This
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Introduction
In perfect financial markets, decision pertaining to debt-
maturity structure is inconsequential to the value of the firm (Stiglitz,
1974; Kraus, 1973).  However, market imperfections such as agency
costs, corporate and personal taxes, information asymmetry,
transaction costs, and bankruptcy costs present unique trade-offs at
different levels of short-term financing and hence provide room for
debt-maturity structure to enhance value of a firm. Seminal work on
the debt-maturity structure in the presence of market imperfections
include (Barnea, Haugen, & Senbet, 1980; Myers, 1977;   Brick and
Ravid, 1991; Diamond, 1991; and Ruiz, 2002) where several others
have examined the relationship between firms’ characteristics and
choice of debt-maturity structure. However, less attention is paid to
examine the relationship between the debt-maturity structure and
firm’s performance. Where the existing scanty research evidences
present mixed results.
The existing theoretical models do not clearly link maturity
structure of a firm with its operating or market performance. For
example, Miller and Modigiliani (1958), Stiglitz (1974) and Kraus (1973)
argue that the firm’s debt-maturity structure is irrelevant to the firm’s
value.  However, the liquidity preference theory posits that short-
term financing is cheaper and could enhance firms’ profitability due
to lower liquidity and/or default premium. Moreover, Datta, Iskandar-
Datta, and Raman (2005) argue that short-term debt can subject
managers to frequent monitoring of the capital markets and therefore
shall result in improved firms’ performance. But a more relevant
question than the expected positive relationship between short-term
financing and profitability is that whether such an increase in
profitability could result in the maximization of shareholders’ wealth.
The answer to the question would be unclear given the liquidity and
refinancing risk that comes with higher level of short-term financing.
In fact frequent refinancing might create maturity mismatch between
assets and liabilities (Stohs and Mauer, 1996). This implies that short-
term financing presents a tradeoff between profitability and liquidity
risk.
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Existing studies that examine relationship between short-term
financing and profitability have largely ignored the risk dimension in
their analyses.  This paper fills this empirical gap, we use inverse of
Altman Z-score as a risk measure. This measure is used in a number of
studies (see e.g. Kim, Mauer and Sherman, 1998 and Drobetz and
Gruninger, 2007). Besides this, our paper contributes to the empirical
literature and use dynamic penal data technique like Generalized
Methods of Moments (GMM). Since GMM incorporates lagged values
of the dependent variable, therefore the expected auto-correlation in
the performance measure due to earning-management is efficiently
tackled by this technique of estimation.
Financial manager of a corporation needs to decide the mix of
long-term and short-term debts. Short-term debts are generally cheaper
and advantageous due to their inherent speed and flexibility but is
riskier than long-term debt. This implies that short-term debts create a
tradeoff between profitability and liquidity risk. Short-term debts are
used for day-to-day business activities; whereas long-term debts are
primarily used for financing projects. If short-term financing affects
both risk and profitability, then a practical question is “does short-
term financing creates value for a firm?”
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study in Pakistan
that uses dynamic penal data technique to investigate the relationship
between short-term financing and risk-adjusted profitability. The
findings of the study will contribute to the existing empirical literature,
and to our understanding of the association among short-term
financing, profitability, and risk of non-financial listed firms. It is also
expected that this study will help financial managers to make effective
debt-maturity structure decisions. The findings of the study may help
Pakistani listed firms to decide whether to continue with the existing
level of short-term financing or make changes if so required.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews
the literature, Section 3 discusses sample, variables, and methodology,
results are discussed in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the study
with offering suggestions for future research.
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Literature Review
Monitoring Role of Short-term Financing and Profitability
Short-term financing matures quickly and needs to be
renewed at frequent intervals. Hence, this could be used as a
monitoring device to control self-interested managers’ actions (Datta
et al, 2005). In less-developed markets like Pakistan, firms primarily
rely on short-term financing where the prime source of which is
commercial banks (Shah and Khan, 2009; Shah, 2011). The literature
on financial contracting establishes that banks can effectively control
moral hazards and adverse selection problems, thanks to their ability
to control and produce information (see for example Diamond, 1984;
Fama, 1985; Berlin and Loeys, 1988). Thus short-term financing and
monitoring might be correlated due to high correlation between short-
term financing and banks in developing countries. The discipline
imposed by short-term financing is likely to improve the operating
performance of a firm. This difference would be visible both in the
income before interest expense and income after interest expense.
Thus monitoring hypothesis predicts that:
H1. Short-term financing has a positive impact on the net income
before interest expense.
Short-term Financing and Cost of Capital
In the imperfect capital markets, the costs of short-term and
long-term financing would differ on account of liquidity preference;
where creditors will demand higher liquidity premium in the case of
long-term loans. In addition, information asymmetry can give rise to
adverse selection and moral hazard problems which magnify the
default risk of long-term financing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). It can be
inferred from the above that short-term financing is cheaper than
long-term financing. However, the relationship portrayed above is
true in an upward sloping yield curve. A weak evidence of the existence
of positive relationship between short-term financing and profitability
in Pakistan is documented by Rahman and Nasr (2007). They report
negative relationship between liquidity and profitability, where they
measured liquidity as the ratio of current asset to current liabilities.
Brick and Ravid (1985) argue that in downward-sloping yield curve
firms make greater use of long-term financing. Moreover, if a firm
faces higher floatation costs as a percentage of funds raised, it might
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not be economical for the firm to issue short-term debt as the frequency
of short term debt issuance is high (Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame,
and Miller, 2005). The floatation costs will be more relevant to small
firms because of the fixed nature of the flotation costs. Malkiel (1964)
states that transaction costs may stop issuers to use short-term debts
for a long period. In the presence of this ambiguity following the
majority, we develop the following hypothesis.
H2. Short-term financing has a positive impact on the earnings after
interest expense and taxes.
Short-term Financing and Risk-Adjusted Profitability
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958) the value of a firm
is not affected by the capital structure. Under the assumption of no
bankruptcy costs, Stiglitz (1969) showed that the MM prediction
remains intact in the presence of bankruptcy. Including the tax and
bankruptcy costs in the analysis Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) showed
that the possible optimal capital structure influences the value of the
firm. Short-term credit is riskier because it is the potential source of
fluctuation in the net income and insolvency and may lead to
bankruptcy, if the firm is financially weak (Brigham, 2001). Greater
dependence on short-term financing exposes the firms to refinancing
and interest rate risks. In the context of the former if growing firms
acquire funds on short-term basis to meet the future funds deficiencies
will need to roll over such debts. If the firm financial condition or that
of the loan market worsens then the firm will face a real danger and the
situation may lead to the level of bankruptcy. In the later type of the
risk, upon renewal the firms will have to pay the prevalent market rate
of interest. On the extreme side, if the term-structure is negatively
sloped, under such circumstances the higher interest cost of short-
term debt will dilute firms’ income that may lead to higher default risk
premium and adversely affect creditworthiness of the firm and exposing
it to greater probability of bankruptcy and financial distress. Even if
the term-structure of interest rates is positive but the inflation
component of nominal interest rates is high and uncertain will cause
the same kind of damage. Leaving better performing companies, others
will face difficulties to pay debt at maturity at any time. Guedes and
Opler (1996) found that financially strong firms make greater use of
short-term debt than the firms, which are financially unsound. The
study of Diamond (1991) showed that firms with the highest credit
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rankings face small refinancing risk and prefer to issue short-term
debt. If a firm faces the refinancing, flotation costs and liquidity
hardship situation then it could prefer long-term debts (Berger et al.,
2005; Datta, et al, 2005). In this context Diamond (1991) modeled that
short-term debt is potential source of suboptimal liquidation risk as
lenders do not value the rent control to its full. This forced suboptimal
liquidation risk may translate into increased bankruptcy costs. This
implies that if not managed optimally, short-term debt may cause
liquidity problem that further can lead to bankruptcy. Therefore, greater
reliance on short-term financing might be profitable but can be a
source of liquidity problem. Rahman and Nasr (2007) have also pointed
to this possible liquidity and profitability trade-off in the case of
Pakistani non-financial firms while investigating the impact of working
capital components on firm profitability. Hence, short-term financing
should not influence risk-adjusted profitability of a firm.
H3. Increase in short-term financing as a percentage of total
liabilities will not increase the risk-adjusted profitability of the
firm.
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
Data for the study is acquired from 352 non-financial firms
listed on the KSE (now Pakistan Stock Exchange) for the period 2003-
2014 from the Balance Sheet Analysis of the State Bank of Pakistan.
Firms with less than two observations are excluded from the sample.
Statistical tools like studentized residuals, leverage, and plots of
residual versus predicted values are used to exclude influential
observations and outliers. In case of studentized residuals,
observations with absolute r = 3.5 or greater were excluded. Finally,
we were left with 2634 observations.
Variables
Return on total assets (ROA) is used as dependant variable
for hypothesis H1. It is defined as earnings before interest and tax
(EBIT) divided by total assets. To test the cost-efficiency hypothesis
we use profit after interest expense and taxes divided by total assets
(PAIT). Research studies on capital structure indicate that ROA is a
significant determinant of capital structure (see e.g. Shah & Hijazi,
2004, Shah & Khan, 2007; Akbar, Ali, & Tariq, 2009; Qurat-ul-Ain, Jan,
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& Rafiq, 2011; Shah & Ilyas, 2014). Joseph and Lipka (2006) describe
that in research related to financial distress profitability ratios are
generally used as measures of firm performance. Moreover, Claessens,
Djankov and Klapper (2003) state that creditors give weight to measures
of profitability at the time of loan extension and/or renegotiation.
Studies of liquidity management have also used ROA as measure of
profitability (Jose, Lancaster & Stevens, 1996). However, Jose et al.
(1996) state that financial structure does not affect ROA.
To test the third hypothesis, profitability is adjusted for risk
dimension of the short-term financing. Firms’ failure to keep promises
to its creditors does not necessarily lead to bankruptcy (Barnes, 1990).
In the context of Pakistan where regulatory authorities and regulatory
actions are slow and the instances of liquidations are rare to hear
about (Shah, 2011; Shah & Khan, 2015), it is expected that the relevant
short-term financing risk is financial distress rather than the risk of
liquidation. In this regard Kim (1978) describes that the trade-off
between the tax advantages of borrowed money and financial distress
costs determine the optimum debt level.  A number of proxies for the
chances of a firm’s bankruptcy or distress have been used in the past
(see e.g., Beaver, 1966; Altman, 1968; Springate, 1978; and Fulmer,
Moon, Gavin, and Erwin, 1984). However, Back, Laitinen, Sere, and
Wezel (1996) establish that there is no single best technique and
significant explanatory risk proxies while they reinvestigated 11 papers
and 31 financial ratios by using discriminate analysis, logit analysis,
and neural networks. On the international horizon, Altman, Haldeman,
and Narayanan (1977) attempt to categorize financially stressed firms
but found no statistical method consistently dominant. We follow
Kim et al (1998) and Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) and use (inverse)
Altma’s (1968) Z-score as a measure of risk. The Z-Score estimates
bankruptcy for public companies by grouping the companies in high
to low bankruptcy categories based on this score. We divide ROA and
PAIT with the inverse of Altman’s Z-Score to compute risk adjusted
profitability measures ROAZ and PAITZ respectively.
The Altman’s Z-score is computed as under:
3.3(EBIT/Total Assets) +0.999(Sales/Total Assets) +0.6(Market
Value of Equity/Total Liabilities) +1.2[(Current Assets - Current
Liabilities)/ (Total Assets)] +1.4(Net Sales / Total Assets)
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Following explanatory variables are used in this study:
The ratio of accumulated short-term financing to total debt
(ASTL) is the independent variable of primary interest. The source of
data provides a single figure for all types of short-term liabilities
including spontaneous and non-spontaneous financing. Generally,
firms are expected to prefer accounts payable to notes payable and
overdraft. The latter two carry higher interest rate of which overdraft
is considered to be costlier. Liquidity risk measured as cash and cash
equivalents to total asset ratio (CATA) is used as control variable.
Several other studies have used cash conversion cycle as a measure
of liquidity risk. Comparison of the two liquidity measures shows
strong positive association (Moss and Stine, 1993). Uyar (2009)
reported significant negative correlation between cash conversion
cycle and profitability as measured by return on asset but not with
profitability when measured by return on equity. In general, firms use
equity financing to mitigate liquidity problems. We expect that greater
stock of this non-earning asset relative to total asset is expected to
negatively influence profitability of firms. Generally, it is argued that
greater sales generate more profitability. In the famous Dupont
analysis, sales turnover is an important ingredient of ROA. We include
sales turnover ratio, which is calculated as dividing sales on total
assets (SATA). Larger firms enjoy economies of scales in their
operations and have greater resources and are able to generate more
sales relative to their smaller competitors. We expect that firms’ size is
positively related to ROA and PAIT. Natural log of sales, denoted by
lnSales, is used as a proxy for firm size. This proxy for the size of firm
has been used in many studies (see e.g Rajan and Zingales 1995,
Shah and Hijazi 2004).
Model Specification
The study estimates the following dynamic panel data (DPD)
models to examine empirical association between corporate
profitability and short-term financing. As compared to any other static
panel data models DPD is the appropriate model for estimating
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In the models above, symbols represent variables explained
in Section 3.2 and i is vector of dummy variables that capture firm-
specific effects that do not change over time. t  is the vector of
dummy variables for year specific effects that do not change across
firms like macroeconomic factors where as ti,  is the error term and is
assumed to be serially uncorrelated with zero mean.
The reliability of the models is subject to the validity of the
instruments incorporated. The consistency of estimates also depends
on the serial correlation in the error terms. Regression results also
show statistics on Sargan’s test of over identifying restrictions and
second order serial correlation. We use System GMM (one-step),
Difference GMM, OLS, Within Group (fixed effect) and Anderson Hsiao
2SLS estimation techniques. However, in the light of the extant
literature of econometrics modeling the results estimated through GMM
technique are considered more reliable that can cater  for
multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity issues. GMM is similar to fixed
effect model and estimates a system of linear equations with common
or different independent variables, and common or different parameters.
If the parameters and some of the independent variables or different
then it is seemly unrelated regression (SUR). SUR allows estimating
same independent variables in the equations as instrument whereas
GMM is more general than SUR and can accommodate number of
different instrumental variables. Here panel data can be treated either
as time series data or as cross section data by treating the variables as
different for different time periods (for details on these estimation
techniques see Anderson and Hsiao, 1982; Arrelano and Bond, 1991;
Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 2000; and Bond, 2002).
Results and Discussion
Descriptive Analysis
The average profitability (ROA) is equal to 9.7%. Baum et al.
(2007), for a sample of around 125,000 German manufacturing firms
and 15000 USA manufacturing firms reported the values as 3.0% and
4.0% respectively. One of the most probable reasons for this variation
might be the lower labor and other costs of doing business in Pakistan.
Firms in the sample make greater use of short-term liabilities (74%)
than those of German (71%) and USA (26%) firms as reported in the
study referred to above. This may be due to the reason that Pakistani
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businesses have but limited options to utilize long-term debts. Our
statistics are consistent with those reported by Shah and Hijazi (2004).
Some studies on cross-country determinants of leverage and debt-
maturity have also found that firms in developing countries make
greater use of short-term debts relative to total debts (Booth, Aivazian,
and Demirguc-Kunt, 2001; Demiriguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999).
The average value for the measure of firms’ size is 14.95. The mean
value of the ratio of cash to assets is 4.3%, this ratio for German and
USA firms are 7% and 11%, respectively. Whereas the average value
of sales-to-total-assets ratio is 117%. Here Pakistani firms exhibit their
inefficiency relative to German firms (211%), however for US firms the
mean value is 113%. Size variable (lnSales) has a mean value of 14.85
and exemplifies the greatest variation across the sample with a
standard deviation of 1.72. On the average firms’ risk-adjusted
profitability is 61.4%.
Table 1:
Descriptive Statistics (2003 – 2014)
Note: ROA is earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. PAIT is
profit after interest expense and taxes divided by total assets. ROAZ and PATZ
are ROA and PAIT divided by the inverse of Altman’s Z-Score respectively.
ASTL is the ratio of accumulated short-term financing to total debt. CATA is
the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total asset. SATA is the ratio of sales to
total assets. lnSales is the natural log of sales and is used as a proxy for firm
size.
Variable  Obs  Mean   Std. Dev.  Min   Max  
ROA   2634  0.097   0.102   -0.282   0.633   
PAIT   2621  0.041   0.091   -0.539   0.434   
ROAZ  2634  0.614   1.078   -1.277   17.283   
PAITZ  2621  0.347   0.774   -1.822   11.850   
lnSales  2634  14.859  1.718   5.075   20.895   
CATA  2634  0.043   0.081   0.000   0.706   
ASTL   2634  0.739   0.211   0.069   1.000   
SATA  2634  1.173   0.783   0.000   6.484 
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Correlations between Variables
Table 2 reports Pearson’s correlations coefficients; the
highest correlation is 0.79 that is observed between ROA and ROAZ.
Moreover, ROAZ has higher correlation of 0.45 with the ratio of sales-
to-total-assets than that of ROA (0.39) with the ratio of sales-to-total-
assets. The ratio of accumulated short-term financing to total liabilities
is negatively correlated with firm size as measured by natural log of
sales. Whited (1992) argued that small firms may resort to use short-
term financing as these firms do not possess sufficient tangible assets
to support long-term debts. The correlation between ASTL and the
ratio of sales-to-total-assets is 0.32 implies that increase in short-term
financing is linked to increase in sales. Similar relation can be noticed
between ASTL and the ratio of cash to total assets indicative of the
notion that increased reliance on short-term financing relative to total
liabilities is managed by focusing on the liquidity issue of firms. Positive
but the lowest correlation (0.11) between ROA and ASTL could be
explained that long-term debt market in Pakistan is not mature enough
and generally all firms profitable or otherwise mainly rely on short-
term modes of financing to fulfill their financial needs and this could
be one of the main reasons to explain this weak correlation. In general,
this is typical phenomenon of emerging economies.
Table 2:
Correlation Coefficients between Variables
Variables  ROA lnSales CATA ASTL SATA ROAZ 
ROA 1      
lnSales 0.41 1     
CATA 0.3095 0.1724 1    
ASTL 0.1136 -0.0177 0.2555 1   
SATA 0.3873 0.3683 0.262 0.3236 1  
ROAZ 0.7921 0.2848 0.3492 0.2097 0.4476 1 
Note: For the definition of variables see note to Table 1. 
Regressions Results
Monitoring Effect: Short-term Financing and Profitability
Table 3 and 4 present results of regressions estimated through
Ordinary Least Squares in levels, the Within Group Fixed Effect,
Anderson - Hsiao 2SLS regression, Difference GMM and finally System
GMM. In WG estimation second lagged ROA and second lagged
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ROAZ are dropped being correlated to first lag of ROA and ROAZ
respectively. All models have both time and industry dummies but
in WG estimation the industry dummies are excluded. All GMM
models are estimated using xtabond2 command written by (Roodman,
2006) for Stata. In OLS estimations, the lagged values of the
dependent variable appearing as explanatory variables are correlated
with the error term and the resultant coefficient is biased upward in
OLS. The WG estimator procedurally eliminates any fixed effects
but these estimators are biased downward. Due to greater precision,
system GMM estimators are considered preferred results for this
study. In Table 3, the â1 value is positive and significant at 1%, in all
five estimations. For both ROA and ROAZ the adjustment coefficient,
Ö= (1-â), is close to 0.5 or less  which provides some evidence that
there is adjustment process and firms manage their profitability in a
manner that does not surprise the markets.
Table 3 presents the results of regression where the
dependent variable is ROA. ASTL is insignificant in all five cases.
The finding is consistent with that for US firms but not with that for
German firms reported by Baum et al. (2007). These results do not
support prediction of the monitoring effect hypothesis. Due to less
developed capital markets and volatile interest rates in developing
countries (Shah & Hijazi, 2004) Pakistani firms use more than optimal
short-term financing.
As expected, the proxy of size is significant at 1% level and
is positively related to ROA under all cases but in system GMM
where it is significant at 5%. First lag of SATA is negative and
significant in the GMM estimations; however it is insignificant in all
other models. Contrary to expectation CATA is significant and
positive in OLS, WG Fixed Effect, and 2SLS but it is significant at
10% in difference GMM and insignificant in system GMM. For full
sample, Baum et al. (2007) reported this variable to be positive and
significant at 1% for both USA and German firms. This result in
Pakistani case might be accidental and not causal. One reason for
the positive sign might be that large Pakistani firms use lesser short-
term financing and have higher ROA with maintaining higher level
of cash (relative to total assets). Consequently, a large cash balance
is associated with size but might not with ROA. However, in some
developing countries such positive association between liquidity
and profitability has been documented. For example Narware (2004)
PAKISTAN BUSINESS REVIEW OCT 2017735
Research Short-Term Financing and Risk-Adjusted
in case of a Srilankan fertilizer company report both positive and
negative association between liquidity and profitability. Similarly,
Bardia (2004) and Sur and Ganguly (2001) found positive association
between liquidity and profitability.
Short-term Financing and Risk (ROAZ)
In Table 4, as hypothesized, greater reliance on short-term
financing relative to total debt does not affect the risk-adjusted
profitability (ROAZ). The coefficient of ASTL is positive but
statistically insignificant in all estimations. However, in difference
GMM, it carries negative sign. It means greater reliance on short-term
funds increase net income as well as risk, resultantly risk-adjusted
profitability remains unchanged. Variables in Sales is negatively
associated to ROAZ and is significant at 5% and 10% in difference
GMM and system GMM, respectively. Contrary to our expectation,
SATAt-1carries negative sign but CATA is positive and significant at
1% in first three models but under GMM estimations it is insignificant.
By keeping larger amounts of cash, Pakistani firms tries to lower the
impact of unavoidable liquidity risk, to which they are exposed.
Cost Effect: Short-term Financing and Profitability
In Table 5, the coefficient of first lag of PAIT is positive and
significant at 1% in all estimations. For both PAIT and PAITZ, the
adjustment coefficient is below 0.5, this is similar to the results in
Table 3.
ASTL is statistically insignificant in all models but has mixed
direction of association with PAIT. The proxy of size is positively
related to PAIT as expected and is significant at 5% and 10 % under
GMM estimations. First lag of SATA is negative in all the estimations
except in 2SLS. It is significant under at 10% and 5% in the two GMM
models. Contrary to expectation, CATA turns out to be positive but it
is insignificant under GMM estimations, exhibiting noticeable
difference with regards to results in Table 3.
Regressions Results: Short-term Financing and Risk (PAITZ)
In Table 6, coefficient value of first lag of PAITZ is positive
and significant in all models. The results support the hypothesis that
greater reliance on short-term financing relative to total debt does not
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affect the risk-adjusted profitability even if the profitability is measured
as profit after interest and taxes. The coefficient of ASTL is positive
but statistically insignificant under both GMM estimations. Overall,
results are similar to that reported in Table 4.
Table 3:
Regressions Results for Short Term Financing and Profitability
(ROA) OLS in level, within group, AH 2SLS, GMM Difference and
GMM System
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS WG Fixed 
Effects 
AH 
2SLS 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
System 
      
ROAt – 1 0.571*** 0.198*** 0.571*** 0.633*** 0.773*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.126) (0.113) 
ROAt – 2 0.146*** -0.080*** 0.146*** -0.162* -0.093 
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.094) (0.078) 
lnSales 0.009*** 0.053*** 0.009*** 0.021*** 0.013** 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) 
CATA 0.108*** 0.173*** 0.108*** 0.164* 0.109 
 (0.024) (0.042) (0.024) (0.096) (0.080) 
ASTL -0.006 0.004 -0.006 -0.020 0.039 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.034) (0.027) 
SATAt - 1 -0.003 0.004 -0.003 -0.034*** -0.033*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.011) (0.009) 
      
Constant -
0.060*** 
-0.707*** -
0.060*** 
0.000 -0.174*** 
 (0.018) (0.097) (0.018) (0.000) (0.065) 
      
Observations 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 
R-squared 0.595 0.213 0.595   
No. of id  303  303 303 
Sargan Test    135.6 114.71 
AR(1)    -5.28 -4.99 
AR(2)    -0.47 0.26 
Note: Dependent variable ROA is earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. 
lnSales is the natural log of sales and is used as a proxy for firm size. CATA is the ratio of cash 
and cash equivalents to total asset. ASTL is the ratio of accumulated short-term financing to 
total debt. SATA is the ratio of sales to total assets. Each estimation technique leaving WG 
include constant, year, and industry dummy variables using 1893 observations of 303 non-
financial listed firms. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in the brackets. x 
tabond2 package for Stata is used to estimate models. Sargan is a Sargan-Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions. AR(k) is the test for k-th order autocorrelation. ***, **, and * 
stands p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1respectively 
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Table 4:
Regressions Results for Short Term Financing and Profitability
(ROAZ) OLS in level, within group, AH 2SLS, GMM Difference, and
GMM System
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS WG Fixed 
Effects 
AH 
2SLS 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM System 
      
ROAZt- 1 0.682*** 0.217** 0.682*** 0.608*** 0.771*** 
 (0.105) (0.103) (0.105) (0.110) (0.087) 
ROAZt - 2 0.144*** -0.013 0.144*** -0.025 0.031 
 (0.055) (0.062) (0.055) (0.091) (0.084) 
lnSales 0.035*** 0.303*** 0.035*** 0.116** 0.068* 
 (0.010) (0.047) (0.010) (0.045) (0.036) 
CATA 1.239*** 1.940*** 1.239*** 0.975 0.542 
 (0.322) (0.510) (0.322) (1.094) (0.833) 
ASTL 0.029 0.019 0.029 -0.219 0.157 
 (0.062) (0.097) (0.062) (0.266) (0.178) 
SATAt - 1 -0.022 0.026 -0.022 -0.207** -0.242*** 
 (0.039) (0.081) (0.039) (0.097) (0.072) 
      
Constant -
0.434*** 
-4.069*** -
0.434*** 
0.000 -0.939** 
 (0.145) (0.678) (0.145) (0.000) (0.428) 
      
Observations 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 
R-squared 0.681 0.143 0.681   
Number of id  303  303 303 
Sargan Test    205.22 195.56 
AR(1)    -4.4 -4.45 
AR(2)    0.86 1.13 
 
Table 5:
Regressions Results for Short Term Financing and Profitability
(PAIT) OLS in level, within group, AH 2SLS, GMM Difference, and
GMM System
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS WG Fixed 
Effects 
AH 
2SLS 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM System 
      
PAITt - 1 0.515*** 0.162*** 0.515*** 0.517*** 0.642*** 
 (0.044) (0.031) (0.044) (0.133) (0.119) 
PAIT t – 2 0.156*** -0.092*** 0.156*** -0.046 -0.044 
 (0.037) (0.024) (0.037) (0.108) (0.087) 
lnSales 0.008*** 0.043*** 0.008*** 0.013** 0.009* 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) 
CATA 0.100*** 0.113*** 0.100*** 0.112 0.088 
 (0.022) (0.042) (0.022) (0.089) (0.072) 
ASTL -0.008 -0.004 -0.008 -0.035 0.024 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.036) (0.028) 
SATA t - 1 -0.001 0.009* -0.001 -0.016* -0.017** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007) 
      
Constant -
0.051*** 
-0.608*** -
0.051*** 
0.000 0.000 
 (0.018) (0.092) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Observations 1,873 1,873 1,873 1,873 1,873 
R-squared 0.526 0.174 0.526   
Number of id  302  302 302 
Sargan Test    145.19 118.88 
AR(1)    -3.82 -3.43 
AR(2)    -0.72 -0.62 
Note: Dependent variable PAIT is profit after interest and tax divided by total assets.  
Other items in the table are as explained in note to Table 3. 
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Table 6:
Regression Results for Short Term Financing and Profitability
(PAITZ) OLS in level, within group, AH 2SLS, GMM Difference,
and GMM System
 (1) (2) (3) (5) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS WG Fixed 
Effects 
AH 2SLS GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
System 
      
PAITZt-1 0.637*** 0.180** 0.637*** 0.522*** 0.690*** 
 (0.091) (0.077) (0.091) (0.104) (0.092) 
PAITZt-2 0.180*** 0.003 0.180*** 0.027 0.088 
 (0.052) (0.058) (0.052) (0.098) (0.086) 
lnSales 0.023*** 0.196*** 0.023*** 0.076** 0.034 
 (0.008) (0.035) (0.008) (0.034) (0.027) 
CATA 0.858*** 1.231*** 0.858*** 0.525 0.276 
 (0.232) (0.378) (0.232) (0.786) (0.583) 
ASTL 0.020 0.000 0.020 -0.265 0.089 
 (0.049) (0.071) (0.049) (0.223) (0.147) 
SATAt-1 -0.009 0.039 -0.009 -0.096 -0.110** 
 (0.024) (0.045) (0.024) (0.069) (0.050) 
      
Constant -
0.315*** 
-2.676*** -
0.315*** 
0.000 0.000 
 (0.102) (0.504) (0.102) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Observations 1,873 1,873 1,873 1,873 1,873 
R-squared 0.653 0.122 0.653   
Number of id  302  302 302 
Sargan Test    222.85 211.92 
AR(1)    -4.35 -4.38 
AR(2)    0.36 0.61 
Note: dependent variable PAITZ is risk-adjusted profitability (profitability per unit of 
risk). It is computed as PAIT divided by altman’s Z score. Other items in the table are as 
explained in note to Table 3.
Conclusion
The issue of corporate debt-maturity structure is considered
an important element in the financial structure of a firm. Theoretically,
debt-maturity structure has implications for both risk and return. In
this study it is hypothesized that greater reliance on short-term
financing is positively related to firms’ profitability because of its
lower cost and monitoring role. However, a higher percentage of short-
term financing is expected to increase risk of financial distress or
insolvency. In light of this risk effect of short-term financing it is
hypothesized that greater reliance on short-term financing will not
affect risk-adjusted profitability of a firm. The study uses partial
adjustment panel data models adopted from the study of Baum et al.,
(2007). The results show that short-term financing is positively related
to profitability; however, the relationship for the sample is statistically
insignificant. Further, the results partially support the contracting
cost hypothesis and signaling hypothesis but not the tax hypothesis.
As far as the relationship between short-term financing and risk
adjusted profitability is concerned, the results confirm the hypothesis
that short-term financing has no impact on risk adjusted profitability
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under GMM estimation procedure and whether profitability is
measured as earnings before interest and taxes or profit after interest
expense and taxes. The results of all variants of dynamic panel data
models and alternative measures of profitability send a strong message
that greater reliance on relative short-term financing does not affect
operational performance of firms included in the sample. The results
indicate that in Pakistan debt-maturity structure is irrelevant probably
due to Pakistan’s unique capital market environment. The results thus
suggest that financial managers in Pakistan should focus on the
investment activities more than on debt-maturity structure.
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